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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past forty years, the number of obese adults in the U.S. dramatically
increased.1 Similarly, obesity rates among children tripled over the past three
decades.2 The growing obesity problem in the U.S. has been attributed to an
*
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**
Professor & Director of Master of Science in Taxation, Department of Accounting &
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research assistants: Pablo Cora, Shanny Mizrachi, Angela Lemmon, Olivia Loibl and Romy
Ron.
1

See Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among US Adults,
1999-2008, 303 JAMA 235, 235 (2010) (finding that from 2007-2008, “the prevalence of
obesity was 32.2% among adult men and 35.5% among adult women”); Ali H. Mokdad et al.,
The Continuing Epidemics of Obesity and Diabetes in the United States, 286 JAMA 1195,
1195 (2001) (finding that “the prevalence of obesity in the U.S. is continuing to increase”).
2

Cynthia L. Ogden et al., Prevalence of High Body Mass Index in US Children and
Adolescents, 2007-2008, 303 JAMA 242, 242 (2010) (observing that since 1980, the obesity
rate among school-age children and adolescents has tripled to approximately 17%).
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increased consumption of nutrient lacking food and beverages and a decline in
physical activity.3 Obesity has significant adverse lifelong health and social
consequences.4 Furthermore, obesity imposes dramatic economic costs, including
increased direct health costs for the overweight individual, reduced earning potential,
embedded costs borne by employers, increased transportation costs, and increased
expenditures by government.5 The externality of costs borne by society arising out of
obesity prompted some to call for the assessment of taxes on unhealthy eating and
sedentary lifestyles to shift the true costs associated to the related behavior back to
individuals.6
National polls suggest that Americans are generally reluctant to support tax
assessment on unhealthy foods and beverages as a policy response to the obesity
problem.7 Recent public opinion polls, however, appear to have shifted noticeably
with almost one quarter of the public identifying obesity as one of the top three
health problems facing America today. 8 This shift in perception may have convinced
more individuals to support the use of narrowly targeted tax assessments to address
the issue.9
In an attempt to control the medical and social costs borne by society at large
incidental to the obesity epidemic, federal and state governments adopted various tax
policies aimed at encouraging individuals to engage in more physical exercise and
eat healthier.10 The goal of such tax legislation is to create a climate in which
engaging in unhealthy behavior becomes “less desirable, less acceptable, and less
accessible.”11 Some of the more commonly adopted government tax policies to
address the obesity epidemic include increasing individual consumption of healthy

3
Bruce M. Spiegelman & Jeffrey S. Flier, Obesity and the Regulation of Energy Balance,
104 CELL 531, 531 (2001) (“The propensity for obesity must have been in our midst for a
long time, only to emerge recently on a large scale as a result of changes in the environment,
in particular the availability and composition of food and reduced requirement for physical
exertion.”).
4

See infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.

5

See infra notes 64-89 and accompanying text.

6

See infra note 121 and accompanying text.

7

See infra note 141 and accompanying text.

8

See infra note 147 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.

10
See Marice Ashe et al., Local Venues for Change: Legal Strategies for Healthy
Environments, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 138, 138 (2007) (“In response to America‟s growing
obesity problem, local policymakers have been looking for legal strategies to adopt in their
communities to encourage healthful behaviors.”). Some have argued that government
interventions are not necessary to address the obesity problem. See Richard Epstein, Let the
Shoemaker Stick to His Last Perspective, 46 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. S138, S139 (2003).
Public health interventions should be directed at communicable diseases and pollutions,
problems partly caused by individuals making choices without accounting for the cost they
impose on others. See id. Obesity is not a communicable disease as one person‟s diet and
lifestyle choices do not put others at greater risk of obesity. See id. at S154.
11

Ashe et al., supra note 10, at 138.
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foods through a tax subsidy, imposing taxes on unhealthy foods and beverages, and
providing tax incentives for individuals to become more physically active.12
The goals of this Article are: (1) to present a comprehensive synthesis of
legislative efforts throughout the country to address the obesity epidemic through the
tax system; (2) to review the body of research on the efficacy of tax legislation to
improve eating patterns and active lifestyle; and (3) to identify tax legislative
strategies that may offer promising future pathways to address the obesity problem.
This Article begins with a brief summary of the growing obesity epidemic in the
U.S. It then explores some of the central contributing factors to the mounting obesity
problem among U.S. children and adults. It also examines the adverse impact and
costs associated with the obesity problem. Next, this Article discusses the
justification for government intervention, as well as the benefits and disadvantages
of using the tax system as a way of shaping consumption and physical activity
patterns. It then summarizes recent efforts by various levels of government in the
U.S. to use the tax system to affect eating and physical activity levels. Lastly, this
Article reviews the research on the impact that current tax legislations have on
healthy eating and physical activity. This Article concludes with suggested future
research on tax legislations that may offer promising future pathways to address the
problem.
II. THE GROWING PREVALENCE OF THE OBESITY PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
Obesity is a major public health issue that challenges the health care system. The
prevalence of obesity significantly increased over the past three decades.13 About
one third of adults in the United States are obese. 14 The rates of obesity in the U.S.
are disproportionately higher among disadvantaged groups. 15 U.S. minorities
represent the highest rates of obesity and overweight individuals.16 Also, according
to an analysis by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), the
highest obesity rates are found among individuals with low income and low
educational attainment.17
While obesity rates among adults drastically increased over the last thirty years, 18
obesity rates among children have become a growing concern, tripling to 17%. 19
12

See infra notes 163-200 and accompanying text.

13

See Mokdad et al., supra note 1, at 1195 (finding that “the prevalence of obesity in the
U.S. is continuing to increase”); see also Youfa Wang & May A. Beydoun, The Obesity
Epidemic in the United States—Gender, Age, Socioeconomic, Racial/Ethnic, and Geographic
Characteristics: A Systematic Review and Meta-Regression Analysis, 29 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV.
6 (2007) (reporting that the obesity prevalence among adults has increased from 13% to 32%
between the 1960s and 2004).
14
See Flegal et al., supra note 1, at 239 (finding that “in 2007-2008, the prevalence of
obesity was 32.2% among adult men and 35.5% among adult women”).
15

See Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among U.S. Adults
1999–2000, 288 JAMA 1723 (2002).
16

See Flegal et al., supra note 15, at 1723.

17

Charlotte A. Schoenborn et al., Body Weight Status of Adults: United States, 1997-98,
330 ADV DATA 1 (2002).
18

See Wang & Beydoum, supra note 13.
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Nearly one-third (31%) of youth ages 6 to 19 years old are considered overweight or
at risk for becoming overweight. 20 Children with low socio-economic status have
higher obesity prevalence rates.21 Recent data from the National Health and Nutrition
Examination Survey found that “low income children and adolescents are more
likely to be obese than their higher income counterparts.”22 Also, children living in
households where the head of household does not have a college degree are more
likely to be obese than those living in households where the head of household has a
college education.23
III. CAUSES OF OBESITY AMONG ADULTS AND CHILDREN
The growing obesity problem in the U.S. is attributed to an increased
consumption of unhealthy foods and a decline in physical activity. 24 Data suggests
that the number of calories consumed by Americans rose significantly during the
period of increased obesity rates.25 The increased caloric consumption is largely
attributed to an increased consumption of carbohydrates26 and sweetened
beverages.27 Similarly, the increase in obesity in the U.S. is correlated with an

19

Cynthia L. Ogden et al., supra note 2, at 242.

20

See Allison A. Hedley et al., Prevalence of Overweight and Obesity Among U.S.
Children, Adolescents, and Adults, 1999-2002, 291 JAMA 2847, 2849 (2004).
21

Cynthia L. Ogden et al., Obesity and Socioeconomic Status in Children and
Adolescents: United States 2005-2008, 51 NCHS DATA BRIEF 1 (2010).
22

Id.

23

Id. (finding that “the relationship is not consistent across race and ethnicity groups”).

24

Spiegelman & Flier, supra note 3, at 531 (“The propensity for obesity must have been
in our midst for a long time, only to emerge recently on a large scale as a result of changes in
the environment, in particular the availability and composition of food and reduced
requirement for physical exertion.”).
25

See Judy Putnum et al., U.S. Per Capita Food Supply Trends: More Calories, Refined
Carbohydrates, and Fats, 25 FOOD REV. 2, 2 (2002) (finding that caloric intake rose by
approximately 12%, or 300 calories per day, between 1985 and 2000).
26

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Trends in the Intake of Energy and
Macronutrients-United States, 1971-2000, 53 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 80, 81
(2004) (finding that the increase in energy intake among men and women between 1971 and
2000 was “attributable primarily to an increase in carbohydrate intake, with a 62.4 gram
increase among women and a 67.7 gram increase among men”); Prithiva Chanmugam et al.,
Did Fat Intake in the United States Really Decline Between 1989-1991 and 1994-1996?, 103
J. AM. DIETARY ASS‟N 867 (2003) (finding that the increased energy intake between 19891991 and 1994-1996 was caused primarily due to higher carbohydrate intake).
27
See Vasanti S. Malik et al., Intake of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain: A
Systematic Review, 84 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 274, 274 (2006) (based on review of prior
studies finding that a greater consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages is associated with
weight gain and obesity); see also Samara J. Nielsen & Barry M. Popkin, Changes in
Beverage Intake Between 1977 and 2001, 27 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 205, 206-07 (2004)
(reporting that the increase in soft drink consumption is a significant contributor to total
caloric intake for adults and children in the U.S.).
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increased prevalence of snacking and in the energy density of snacks consumed,
particularly among children and young adults. 28
Some researchers link the recent increase in high-caloric-food consumption to
the decline in food prices over the last century. 29 Some contend that federal
infrastructure created incentives to produce highly processed, caloric dense food,
which resulted in a price reduction of those food items. 30 The relative price reduction
of energy-dense food items may have resulted in an increase in the amount of food
consumed at each meal, as well as in the amount of food consumed between meals. 31
Aside from a reduction in relative price, increased consumption of high caloric food
is also linked to a rise in the availability and accessibility of fast food restaurants, 32
as well as an increase in television viewing.33

28

Claire Zizza et al., Significant Increase in Young Adults’ Snacking Between 1977-1978
and 1994-1996 Represents a Cause for Concern!, 32 PREVENTATIVE MED. 303, 305-06 (2001)
(finding that not only snacking prevalence among young adults increased from 77% to 84%,
but also the proportion of total daily energy intake from snacks has increased from 20% to
23% between 1977-78 and 1994-96); see also Lisa Jahns et al., The Increasing Prevalence of
Snacking Among U.S. Children from 1977 to 1996, 138 J. PEDIATRICS 493, 495 (2001)
(finding that the prevalence of snackers among children increased from 77% to 91% between
1977 and 1996, as well as finding that children report a greater number of snacking occasions
per day).
29

Shin-Yi Chou et al., An Economic Analysis of Adult Obesity: Results from the
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 565, 584 (2004) (concluding
that the increase in weight outcomes is attributable in part to the decline in food prices).
30

ZOLTAN J. ACS ET AL., THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF OBESITY,
PUBLIC POLICY 135 (Zoltan J. Acs & Alan Lyles, eds., 2007).

IN

OBESITY, BUSINESS

AND

31

See Samara J. Nielsen & Barry M. Popkin, Patterns and Trends in Food Portion Sizes,
1977-1998, 289 JAMA 450, 451 (2003) (finding a growth in the portion sizes for the majority
of foods examined between 1977 and 1996 among Americans aged 2 years old and older); see
also Lisa R. Young & Marion Nestle, The Contribution of Expanding Portion Sizes to the U.S.
Obesity Epidemic, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 246, 247 (2002) (finding that the serving sizes of
largely all food and beverages consumed away from home have increased over time).
32

See Chou et al., supra note 29, at 584 (linking rise in adults‟ body weight to the increase
in the availability of fast-food and full-service restaurants).
33
See William H. Dietz & Steven L. Gortmaker, Do We Fatten Our Children at the
Television Set? Obesity and Television Viewing in Children and Adolescents, 75 PEDIATRICS
807, 810 (1985) (finding a “highly significant and reproducible associations of television
watching with obesity in children and adolescents in both cross-sectional and prospective
studies”); Robert W. Jeffery & Simone A. French, Epidemic Obesity in the United States: Are
Fast Foods and Television Viewing Contributing?, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 277, 278 (1998)
(finding that hours of television viewing per day was positively associated with body mass
index). The association of television viewing and obesity may be influenced in part by the
tendency of people to consume more high-calorie foods while watching television. See
generally Katharine A. Coon & Katherine L. Tucker, Television and Children’s Consumption
Pattern, A Review of the Literature, 54 MINERVA PEDIATRICA 423 (2002) (finding that
“greater TV use has been associated with higher intakes of energy, fat, sweet and salty snacks,
and carbonated beverages and lower intakes of fruit and vegetables. Several large studies have
documented associations between number of hours of TV watched and both the prevalence
and incidence of obesity.”).
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The growing obesity epidemic is also attributed to the increased sedentary nature
of Americans.34 Engaging in physical activity affects daily energy expenditure level
and helps to prevent obesity.35 Less than one quarter of American adults engage in
physical activity on a regular basis, and more than half of adults pursue an almost
entirely sedentary lifestyle.36 Physical activity declines dramatically across age
groups, starting in childhood and continuing into adulthood. 37 For example, 42% of
children ages 6 to 11 years old meet the recommended 60 minutes per day of
physical activity, but only 8% of adolescents do the same. 38 Among adults, less than
5% meet the recommended 30 minutes per day of physical activity. 39
The growing sedentary nature of American society is attributed to
industrialization,40 technological advancements,41 and urban sprawl.42 Furthermore,
the increased distance of children‟s home from their school, as well as traffic danger
along walking routes, prevents many children from walking to school.43 Recent
educational policy (i.e., No Child Left Behind, also known as “NCLB”) also
34

Russell Rising et al., Determinants of Total Daily Energy Expenditure: Variability in
Physical Activity, 59 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 800, 802 (1994) (concluding that obesity is
associated with lower levels of physical activity).
35

See John M. Jakicic & Amy D. Otto, Physical Activity Considerations for the Treatment
and Prevention of Obesity, 82 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 226S, 227S (2005) (indicating that
physical activity is an important component on long-term weight control).
36
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHRONIC
DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND HEALTH: A REPORT
OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, 180, 200 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ed.,
1996) (finding that the percentage of U.S. adults meeting this definition of regular, sustained
activity during leisure time was about 22 % and that one fourth of U.S. adults do not engage in
any leisure-time physical activity).
37
See Richard P. Troiano et al., Physical Activity in the United States Measured by
Accelerometer, 40 MED. & SCI. IN SPORTS & EXERCISE 181 (2008).
38

Id.

39

Id.

40

See Ann M. Swartz, Leah Squires & Scott J. Strath, Energy Expenditure of
Interruptions to Sedentary Behavior, 8 INT‟L J. BEHAV. NUTRITION & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 69,
69 (2011) (“Based on well-executed epidemiological research, it has been suggested that large
amounts of daily sedentary behavior is a challenge to the health of individuals living in
industrialized nations.”).
41

Ross C. Brownson et al., Declining Rates of Physical Activity in the United States: What
Are the Contributors?, 26 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 421, 437 (2005) (attributing the increase in
sedentary nature of Americans to technological changes in the workplace (fewer occupations
involving physical labor), in the home (increase of “labor saving devices”), and in transport
systems (pervasive use of cars)).
42

See id. at 438; see also Reid Ewing et al., Relationship Between Urban Sprawl and
Physical Activity, Obesity, and Morbidity, 18 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 47, 54 (2003)
(finding that residents of sprawling counties were likely to walk less during leisure time and
weigh more).
43

ACTIVE LIVING RESEARCH, WALKING AND BIKING TO SCHOOL, PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND
HEALTH OUTCOMES 1 (Active Living Research ed., 2009).
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prevents many children from obtaining sufficient physical education instruction
during the school day.44 Under NCLB legislation, schools are held accountable for
core subjects such as math, reading, and science. 45 But NCLB does not hold schools
accountable for physical education. 46 Consequently, teachers and administrators
focus school hours on math, reading, and science, and place less emphasis on
physical education.47 Finally, an increase in the number of dual working parent
families has contributed to children‟s inability to participate in a variety of afterschool physical-activity programs.48
IV. THE IMPACT AND COSTS OF OBESITY
Obesity has a dramatic adverse impact on one‟s health. It serves as a major
contributor to several other chronic diseases, including type II diabetes, 49
cardiovascular disease,50 and cancer.51 Obesity is linked to the following cancers:
endometrial, postmenopausal breast, kidney, and colon.52 It is a leading cause of
preventable death among adults in the United States. 53 Studies have found a large
44
KELLEY V. KING & SASHA ZUCKER, CURRICULUM NARROWING 5 (Pearson Education ed.,
2005).
45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

See generally Kristen K. Davison et al., Parents’ Activity-Related Parenting Practices
Predict Girls’ Physical Activity, 35 MED. SCI. IN SPORTS & EXERCISE 1589 (2003) (finding that
“girls reported significantly higher levels of physical activity when at least one parent reported
high levels of overall support in comparison to no parents”); see also James F. Sallis et al., A
Review of Correlates of Physical Activity of Children and Adolescents, 32 MED. SCI. SPORTS
EXERCISE 93, 966 (2000) (variables associated with physical activity included direct support
from parents).
49

See Earl S. Ford et al., Weight Change and Diabetes Incidence: Findings from a
National Cohort of US Adults, 146 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 214, 217 (1997) (finding that the
increase in body mass index in the United States that occurred during the 1980s may be have
contributed to the increase in the incidence of non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus).
50

See Alison E. Field et al., Impact of Overweight on the Risk of Developing Common
Chronic Diseases During a 10-Year Period, 161 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1581, 1582 (2001)
(observing that the risk of developing diabetes, gallstones, hypertension, heart disease, and
stroke increased with severity of overweight among both women and men); Aviva Must et al.,
The Disease Burden Associated with Overweight and Obesity, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS‟N 1523,
1526 (1999) (finding an increase in prevalence ratio of gallbladder disease, high blood
cholesterol level, high blood pressure, and osteoarthritis with an increasing severity of
overweight and obesity among adults).
51

See Franca Bianchini et al., Overweight, Obesity, and Cancer Risk, 3 LANCENT
ONCOLOGY 565 (2002) (summarizing prior research showing that overweight is directly
related to the risk of cancer, including colon, breast, endometrium, esophagus, and kidney).
52
53

Id.

See David B. Allison et al., Annual Deaths Attributable to Obesity in the United States,
282 J. AM. MED. ASS‟N 530 (1999) (estimating that 300,000 U.S. adults die of causes related
to obesity each year); Kelly D. Brownnell et al., The Public Health and Economic Benefits of
Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1599, 1601-02 (2009).
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decrease in life expectancy associated with obesity. 54 Similarly, overweight and
obese youths are at risk for adverse health outcomes. 55 Childhood obesity has been
linked to an increased onset of type II diabetes and a higher risk for cardiovascular
disease.56 Research also suggests that the risk of new-onset asthma is higher among
overweight youth.57 Other consequences of childhood obesity include metabolic
syndrome, obstructive sleep apnea, and depression. 58 Finally, researchers have found
that childhood obesity continues into adulthood where the problem persists. 59
Being overweight also has important negative social consequences. This includes
a lower likelihood that a woman will marry, 60 greater impairment at work, as well as
impairment of routine daily activities when compared to non-obese individuals.61
Aside from the adverse health and social consequences, obesity imposes
economic costs on three levels.62 On an individual level, obesity results in increased
health costs.63 Studies suggest the healthcare costs for obese and overweight
54
See Anna Peeters et al., Obesity in Adulthood and Its Consequences for Life
Expectancy: A Life-Table Analysis, 138 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 24, 26-27 (2003) (finding
large decreases in life expectancy were associated with overweight and obesity).
55
See generally Stephen R. Daniels et al., Overweight in Children and Adolescents:
Pathophysiology, Consequences, Prevention, and Treatment, 111 CIRCULATION 1999, 2001
(2005) (“Several studies suggest that early rebound of the BMI is associated with an increased
risk of higher BMI in adulthood.”).
56
See id. (“Obesity present in adolescence has been shown to be associated with increased
overall mortality and specifically with increased risk of CVD and diabetes in adult men and
women.”).
57

See id. at 2002 (listing asthma as an adverse outcome of childhood obesity).

58

See id. (“The prevalence of the metabolic syndrome in adolescents is 4% overall, but it
is 30% to 50% in overweight children.”). Studies support the premise “that psychopathology
is associated with obesity in children.” Id. at 2003. An increased BMI “was related to an
increased risk of obstructive sleep apnea in children and adolescents.” Id.
59

See id. at 2001 (“Several studies suggest that early rebound of the BMI is associated
with an increased risk of higher BMI in adulthood.”).
60
See Dalton Conlley & Rebecca Glauber, Gender, Body Mass, and Socioeconomic
Status: New Evidence from the PSID, 17 THE ECONOMICS OF OBESITY 253, 271 (Kristin Bolin
& John Cawley eds., 2007) (finding that obesity reduces women‟s likelihood of getting
married by 16% compared to non-obese women).
61

See Donna M. Gates et al., Obesity and Presenteeism: The Impact of Body Mass Index
on Workplace Productivity, 50 J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. 39, 42-43 (2008) (finding that
extreme obesity is associated with significantly greater health-related limitations in the
workplace); Helena W. Rodbard et al., Impact of Obesity on Work Productivity and Role
Disability in Individuals with and at Risk for Diabetes Mellitus, 23 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION
353, 357 (2009) (concluding that obesity was associated with impairment of work
productivity, routine daily activities, and overall impairment).
62

C. Ford Runge, The Economic Consequences of the Obese, 1 (University of Minnesota
Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy, Working Paper No. 07-1, 2007),
available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/7261/2/wp07-01.pdf.
63

See Eric A. Finkelstein et al., National Medical Spending Attributed to Overweight and
Obesity: How Much, and Who’s Paying?, W-3 HEALTH AFF. 219 (2003).
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individuals are 37% higher.64 Obesity causes a 36% increase in in-patient and outpatient spending and a 77% increase in medication costs.65 Obesity also impairs the
ability of an individual to earn income from work. Research suggests the probability
of employment is significantly lower for obese individuals. 66 Further, employers
discriminate against an obese applicant at times, and regard obesity as a signal of
lower productivity.67 There is also evidence that obesity may reduce income levels
for those who are employed.68
Obesity also imposes costs on the labor market. 69 Employees‟ absenteeism from
work for obesity-related health reasons results in a productivity loss. 70 Researchers
found a positive and statistically significant correlation between obesity and higher
rates of absenteeism from work.71 Productivity loss may also occur as a result of a
64

See id. at 222 (“The average increase in annual medical spending associated with
obesity is 37.4 percent ($732) and ranges from 26.1 percent ($125) for out-of-pocket to 36.8
percent ($1,486) for Medicare and 39.1 percent ($864) for Medicaid.”).
65

See Ronald Strum, The Effects of Obesity, Smoking, and Drinking on Medical Problems
and Costs, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 245, 247 (2002) (researched analyzed national data in the U.S.
and found that obesity is associated with a 36% increase in in-patient and out-patient
spending, as well as a 77% increase in medication costs, with an average premium of $395 in
individual care costs over a non-obese person).
66
See John Cawley & Sheldon Danziger, Morbid Obesity and the Transition from Welfare
to Work, 24 J. POL‟Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 727, 734 (2005) (“Specifically, being morbidily
obese is associated with 17.6% greater probability of not working.”); Petter Lundborg et al.,
Obesity and Occupational Attainment Among the 50+ of Europe, 17 THE ECONOMICS OF
OBESITY 219, at 242 (Kristin Bolin & John Cawley, eds., 2007) (finding that being obese was
associated with a lower probability of being employed).
67
See Jens Agerström & Dan-Olof Rooth, The Role of Automatic Obesity Stereotypes in
Real Hiring Discrimination, 96 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 790, 797 (2011) (finding that employer‟s
bias predicts labor-market discrimination against obese people).
68

See John Cawley, The Impact of Obesity on Wages, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 451, 468
(2004) (finding that heavier-weight white females, black females, Hispanic females and
Hispanic males tend to earn less than their normal weight counterparts); Steven L. Gortmaker
et al., Social and Economic Consequences of Overweight in Adolescence and Young
Adulthood, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1008, 1009-10 (1993) (indicating that overweight young
adults tend to marry less often and have lower household incomes compared to their nonoverweight counterparts, regardless of their socioeconomic status and aptitude scores);
Lundborg et al., supra note 66, at 243 (finding that obese European women over 50 earned
10% less than their non-obese counterparts).
69

See Ross A. Hammond & Ruth Levine, The Economic Impact of Obesity in the United
States, 3 DIABETES, METABOLIC SYNDROME AND OBESITY: TARGETS AND THERAPY 285, 288
(2010) (listing a number of sub-categories relating to productivity costs in the labor market).
70
71

See id.

See Emily D. Durden et al., Economic Costs of Obesity to Self-Insured Employers, 50 J.
OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 991, 994 (2008) (finding that obese employees were 194% more
likely to use paid time off than their non-obese counterparts, while the severely obese were
278% more likely to do the same); Seth. A. Serxner et al., The Impact of Behavioral Health
Risks on Worker Absenteeism, 43 J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL MED. 347, 350 (Table 3) (2001)
(finding that employees who were at risk for obesity were 1.23 times more likely to be in the
“high-absenteeism” group than those were who not at risk for obesity); Shan P. Tsai et al., The
Impact of Obesity on Illness Absence and Productivity in an Industrial Population of
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decrease in productivity from an employee while present at work. 72 Presenteeism
arises when a physical or a mental health condition that is more prevalent among
obese individuals adversely affects the obese employee‟s productivity while in the
workplace.73 Studies have found a strong association between obesity and
presenteeism at work.74 Moreover, employers endure losses as a result of lost
productivity and underperformance linked to their obese employees‟ work
limitations.75 The cost of the lost productive time is substantial, estimated at $11.7
billion per year.76
Aside from lost productivity in the labor market, employers incur significant
healthcare costs incidental to obese employees.77 Employers expend resources in an
attempt to reduce obesity related costs by offering employees various health
promotion programs, establishing on-site exercise facilities, sponsoring exercise and
fitness programs, and providing financial incentives to encourage workers to enroll
in wellness programs.78
In addition, obesity results in increased transportation costs.79 For example, the
CDC reported that airline passengers‟ weight in 2000, when compared to that of the
Petrochemical Workers, 18 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 8, 10 (2008) (finding that in the North
American division of Shell Oil Company, obese employees were on average absent from work
3.7 additional days per year compared to their normal-weight counterparts).
72

Eric A. Finkelstein et al., The Costs of Obesity in the Workplace, 52 J. OCCUPATIONAL
ENVTL. MED. 971 (2010).
73

See Hammond & Levine, supra note 69, at 289.

74

See Judith A. Ricci & Elsbeth Chee, Lost Productive Time Associated with Excess
Weight in the US Workforce, 47 J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL MED. 1227, 1229 (2005) (finding
that obese workers were significantly more likely to report health-related loss productive time
than either normal-weight or overweight workers).
75
See Robin P. Hertz et al., The Impact of Obesity on Work Limitations and
Cardiovascular Risk Factors in the U.S. Workforce, 46 J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 1196,
1198 (2004) (finding that 7% of obese employees have work limitations due to physical,
mental, or emotional problem versus 3% of normal-weight or overweight workers).
76
See Ricci & Chee, supra note 74, at 1231 (“Compared with normal-weight workers,
obese workers cost U.S. employers an estimated $11.70 billion per year in excess healthrelated [lost productive time].”).
77
See David Thompson et al., Estimated Economic Costs of Obesity to U.S. Business, 13
AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 120, 124 (1998) (estimating that the annual costs associated with
obesity on businesses in the U.S. to be $12.7 billion); Feifei Wang et al., Relationship of Body
Mass Index and Physical Activity to Health Care Costs Among Employees, 46 J.
OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 428, 431 (2004) (finding that the annual healthcare costs of a
large manufacturing company were $488 more for obese employees compared with normalweight employees).
78

See Shari L. Barkin et al., Millennial and the World of Work: The Impact of Obesity on
Health and Productivity, 25 J. BUS. & PSYCH. 239, 242 (2010) (describing various ways
employers have been incorporating wellness programs into the work place and citing a report
finding that in 2006, 19% of employers with more than 500 employees had wellness
programs, up from 7% two years earlier).
79
See Sheldon H. Jacobson & Douglas M. King, Measuring the Potential for Automobile
Fuel Savings in the US: The Impact of Obesity, 14 TRANSP. RES. PART D: TRANSPORT AND
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previous decade, has led airlines to spend an estimated additional $275 million to
burn an extra 350 million gallons of fuel. 80 Similarly, a study found that the growing
obesity rates in the U.S. increase fuel consumption by adding passenger weight to
vehicles.81
Finally, obesity affects expenditures by local, state, and national governments
because publicly funded programs cover some of the medical costs of illnesses
associated with obesity.82 U.S. taxpayers finance nearly half of all direct medical
costs associated with the obesity epidemic through Medicare and Medicaid. 83 Studies
suggest that medical costs associated with obesity are substantial.84 Obese
individuals tend to utilize medical services at a greater frequency compared to
normal weight individuals.85 For example, compared to normal weight individuals, it
is estimated that obese adults with a body mass index between 35 and 39 have 14%
and 25%, respectively, more physician visits than normal weight adults. 86 Similarly,
obese individuals have a greater use of hospital services. As a result, medical costs
incurred by obese individuals are significantly higher than medical costs incurred by
normal weight individuals.87 For example, one study found that obese individuals
incurred 36% higher-average-annual healthcare costs than healthy-weight

ENV‟T. 6, 11 (2009) (estimating the additional annual fuel consumption by noncommercial
passenger highway travel in the U.S. that is associated with overweight and obesity to be
approximately one billion gallons).
80

See Andrew L. Dannenberg et al., Economic and Environmental Costs of Obesity: The
Impact on Airlines, 27 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 264, 264 (2004) (calculating that weight gain
during the 1990s required approximately 350 million extra gallons of jet fuel in the year 2000
and extra airline fuel costs to be approximately $275 million in the year 2000 alone).
81

See Jacobson & King, supra note 79, at 7.

82

See JULIE A. ELSTON ET AL., TAX SOLUTIONS TO THE EXTERNAL COSTS OF OBESITY,
OBESITY, BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY 171, 173 (Zoltan J. Acs et al., 2007) (“Publicly funded
health programs such as Medicare, Medicaid and Veterans benefits disproportionately absorb
the additional medical costs [of obesity] since obesity and poverty are correlated.”).
83

Id.; Eric A. Finkelstein et al., State-Level Estimates of Annual Medical Expenditures
Attributable to Obesity, 12 OBESITY RES. 18, 23-4 (2004) (finding that 49% of medical costs
incidental to obesity is incurred by Medicare and Medicaid); Eric A. Finkelstein et al.,
Economic Causes and Consequences of Obesity, 26 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 239, 248 (2005)
(estimating that “the government finances roughly half of the total annual medical costs
attributable to obesity”).
84

See Finkelstein et al., supra note 63, at 219.

85

See Charles P. Quesenberry et al., Obesity, Health Services Use, and Health Care Costs
Among Members of a Health Maintenance Organization, 158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 466,
467 (1998).
86

See id. at 470, Table 3; see also David Thompson et al., Body Mass Index and Future
Healthcare Costs: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 9 OBESITY RES. 210, 212 (2001) (finding
that obese adults have 49% more inpatient days per year and 1.8 times more pharmacy
dispenses, including 6 times the number of dispenses for diabetes medications and 3.4 times
the number of dispenses for cardiovascular medications).
87

See Finkelstein et al., supra note 63, at 219.
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individuals.88 In the aggregate, total medical costs incidental to obesity were
estimated to be as high as $147 billion in 2008—almost 10% of all U.S. medical
spending.89
V. JUSTIFICATION FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION:
Despite the adverse health outcomes of obesity, economists generally assert that
individuals should be at liberty to choose how to allocate their money and time
relating to physical exercise and diet.90 Hence, individuals should be free to engage
in activities including those which subject them to an increased chance of becoming
obese.91 That is, the existence of adverse consequences from obesity does not per se
mean that a government intervention to address the obesity problem is necessary. 92
Instead, government intervention may be justified only when necessary to correct
market failure,93 such as in cases where the behavior creates externalities. 94

88

See Anne M. Wolf, Economic Outcomes of the Obese Patient, 10 OBESITY RES. 58S
(2002) (“Overall, obesity (BMI 30 kg/m2) is associated with greater healthcare use and cost,
particularly pharmaceutical and laboratory costs.”).
89
See Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity: Payerand Service-Specific Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFF. 822, 828 (2009) (“In aggregate, the annual
medical burden of obesity has increased from 6.5 percent to 9.1 percent of annual medical
spending and could be as high as $147 billion per year (in 2008 dollars) based on the NHEA
estimate”).
90

Michael McCarthy, The Economics of Obesity, 364 THE LANCET 2169, 2170 (2004).

91

See Patricia M. Anderson et al., Economic Perspectives on Childhood Obesity, 27
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 30, 31 (2003) (“People make a choice and if they choose to eat more
and exercise less in the face of the current environment, it must be because that makes them
happier than eating less and exercising more.”); ELSTON ET AL., supra note 82, at 173 (“As
long as the individual making the choice to become obese can do so freely, with full
information as to the costs of consequences of their choice and without placing a burden on
the rest of society, they ought to be free to do so.”).
92
See Jonathan Cummings, Obesity and Unhealthy Consumption: The Public-Policy Case
for Placing a Federal Sin Tax on Sugary Beverages, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 273, 290-98
(2010) (detailing the rationale used by opponents of a tax on sugary beverages).
93

See Robin A. McKinnon, A Rationale for Policy Intervention in Reducing Obesity, 12
AM. MED. ASS‟N J. ETHICS 309, 310 (2010) (“Policy solutions are considered warranted in the
event of „market failure.‟”); ELSTON ET AL., supra note 82, at 171 (“[U]nless a case can be
made for some form of market failure, society is best served by avoiding interventions in the
markets for goods and services.”).
94
See JAY BHATTACHARYA & NEERAJ SOOD, HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE OBESITY
EXTERNALITY, THE ECONOMICS OF OBESITY, 279, 280 (Kristin Bolin and John Cawley, eds.,
2007) (“In accordance with traditional economic practice, we argue that it is the costs of
bodyweight decisions not borne by an adult making those decisions (hereafter, external costs)
that are most relevant to public policy. If external costs are high, then public welfare can be
improved by interventions that change the incentives adults face when making decisions about
bodyweight.”); Barry McCormick et al., Economic Cost of Obesity and the Case for
Government Intervention, 8 OBESITY REV. 161, 162 (2007) (suggesting that externalities
arising out of obesity may be a legitimate basis for government intervention in this area).
Aside from justifying government intervention based on externalities, another category of
justification relates to actions needed to protect individuals who are unable to make rational
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An externality arises when the costs or damage arising out of an individual‟s
behavior are not fully internalized by the individual, but are instead borne by one or
more individuals who will not engage in the conduct which led to the costs at hand. 95
Specifically, individuals may choose to engage in a sedentary lifestyle and poor
diet.96 As long as the individual, who is informed of the risks associated with his
conduct, pays for the costs arising out of these decisions, then government
intervention is not justified.97 If the individual fails to bear the full costs, however,
then society must bear the cost of this externality. 98
Externality in the case of obesity arises when obese individuals do not fully pay
for medical care by virtue of risk pooling.99 Through risk-pooling obese and nonobese individuals, private health insurance companies assess higher rates compared
to what would be charged in the absence of the obese group. 100 One study estimated
that physically active individuals pay a total subsidy of approximately $1,900 over a
lifetime through cost sharing in collectively-financed, group-insurance programs.101
The additional medical care costs related to obesity are borne not only by private
insurance companies shifting costs to the non-obese insured, but also by public
insurance programs.102 Publicly funded health insurance programs, such as Medicare
and Medicaid, bear significant obesity-related medical costs given the association
between obesity and poverty.103 Researchers estimate that the government funds
decisions. Id. This basis would appear to be pertinent for government intervention in
addressing obesity among children and youth. Id.
95
See ELSTON ET AL., supra note 82, at 174 (“Economists define an externality as an event
that confers an appreciable damage (or benefit) on one or more individuals who were not fully
consenting parties in reaching the decisions that led to the negative (or positive) event in
question.”); see Jeff Strand, Conceptualizing the ―Fat Tax‖: The Role of Food Taxes in
Developed Countries, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1240 (2005).
96

Strand, supra note 95, at 1240.

97

Id. at 1240-41.

98

Id. at 1236 (“„Moral hazard‟ generates this externality: a fully insured individual has no
incentive to expend costs to avoid the damage inherent in the insured event. If the expected
value of that damage exceeds the avoidance costs, the failure to avoid the damage will be
inefficient. One way to address this externality is to use food taxes as „implicit premiums‟ in
an "implicit insurance system.”).
99
ELSTON ET AL., supra note 82, at 173 (“[O]besity related health costs are more likely to
be shared by others, including those who expend a great deal of effort to reduce their risk of
becoming obese, through the pooling of health insurance risks.”).
100

Id. at 173-74.

101

Emmett B. Keeler et al., The External Cost of a Sedentary Life Style, 79 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 975, 978 (1989) (estimating that the non-obese individual provided a $1,900 lifetime
subsidy to obese individuals through risk pooling).
102

ELSTON ET AL., supra note 82, at 173 (“The additional health-care costs of obesity fall
not only on private insurance who could adjust rates in response to individual risks, but also
on public insurers.”).
103
Id. “Publicly funded health programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and Veterans
benefits disproportionately absorb the additional medical costs [of obesity] since obesity and
poverty are correlated.” Id.
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approximately half the total annual medical costs related to obesity. 104 As a result,
the average taxpayer pays “approximately $175 per year to finance obesity related
medical expenditures among Medicare and Medicaid recipients.” 105
However, the net costs externalized by obesity are somewhat unclear.106 While
medical care for obese individuals is higher, it is not clear that the cost of medical
care over a lifetime is higher due to the shorter lifespan of obese individuals. 107
Furthermore, the lower life expectancies of obese individuals likely result in a
reduction of other public expenditures, such as Social Security and similar public
pensions.108 Thus, it is not entirely clear that obesity imposes an overall cost to
society since there may be societal savings from foregone public pension benefits
and public health care costs in later years of life. 109
Aside from the possible externalities related to obesity, government intervention
may be justified because of market failure arising out of imperfect rationality. 110
Under imperfect rationality considerations, individuals are not viewed as truly free
agents in their decisions relating to diet and physical activity. 111 For example,
children are not considered rational actors and are viewed as fairly unable to control
their behavior relating to diet and exercise because they do not purchase their own
food and, to a large extent, do not decide how to spend their time.112 Similarly, some
104

See Finkelstein et al., supra note 72, at 226.

105

See Finkelstein et al., supra note 83, at 248.

106

Compare TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE LONG-RUN GROWTH IN
OBESITY AS A FUNCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 1, 20 (Nat‟l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7423, 1999) (“Overall, one may argue that the case has not been made that
obesity generates negative externalities large enough to justify government intervention to
reduce its prevalence.”), with McKinnon, supra note 93, at 310 (“[D]oes widespread obesity
in the U.S. provide a sufficiently strong basis for intervention in the market? Evidence
suggests that it does, on three grounds: (1) imperfect rationality (which, though it is not
universally accepted as an instance of market failure, undermines fundamental assumptions
about the functioning of the market); (2) asymmetric information; and (3) financial
externalities.”).
107
Pieter H. M. van Baal et al., Lifetime Medical Costs of Obesity: Prevention No Cure for
Increasing Health Expenditure, 5 PUB. LIBR. SCI. e29 (2008) (“Despite the higher annual costs
of the obese and smoking cohorts, the healthy-living cohort incurs highest lifetime costs, due
to its higher life expectancy.”).
108

McCormick et al., supra note 94, at 163 (arguing that the medical expenses associated
with obesity have been exaggerated because of the cost savings resulting from the tendency of
obese people to die earlier).
109

Id.

110

Strand, supra note 95, at 1255 (asserting that most consumers suffer for a “lack of
perfect foresight”).
111

See George Loewenstein et al., Asymmetric Paternalism to Improve Health Behaviors,
298 JAMA 2415, 2415 (2007) (suggesting that most individuals tend to heavily discount the
future so it is easy for them to rationalize that the short-term benefits exceed the costs in terms
of over-eating and consuming high-caloric-content food).
112

John Crawley, An Economic Framework for Understanding Physical Activity and
Eating Behaviors, 27 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED., 117, 122 (2004) (suggesting that children‟s
obesity may be attributed to children‟s imperfect rationality); McKinnon, supra note 93, at
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adults are not entirely free to engage in an active lifestyle and a healthy diet due to
physiological, self-control, or cognitive challenges.113 For example, lacking perfect
foresight, some adults may not appreciate the impact of their currently unhealthy
eating and inactive lifestyle on the potential impact on their future health
outcomes.114
Finally, some contend that market failure in the form of asymmetric information
justifies government intervention to address the obesity prevalence. 115 First, some
contend that the information disseminated by governments related to healthy eating
and physical activity is significantly lacking compared to the amount of information
on the subject made available by food producers. 116 Lack of information about the
caloric content of food is particularly widespread in the context of food prepared
outside the home.117 Moreover, research suggests that many individuals, with access
to this information do not have an accurate understanding of the information‟s
implication to their health.118 Consumers‟ limited computational skills and memory
capacity may restrict their ability to make sound decisions about their eating
patterns, activity level, and health. 119 Furthermore, the costs and burdens associated
with interpreting nutritional information of various food options may be too
prohibitive to many even when the information is readily accessible.120
310 (“It is well accepted in economic literature that children are not rational actors. In other
words, they are not capable of judging their own welfare accurately.”).
113
Anderson et al., supra note 91, at 32 (suggesting that not all adults are free choosing
relating to their diet given their limited self-control and physiological characteristics);
LAURETTE DUBE ET AL., OBESITY PREVENTION: THE ROLE OF BRAIN AND SOCIETY ON
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 437 (1st ed. 2010) (“In the context of inter-temporal choice, people
exhibit dynamic inconsistency, valuing present consumption much more than future
consumption. In other words, people have self-control problems.”).
114
See Strand, supra note 95, at 1255 (commenting that most consumers lack perfect
foresight and hence “may not understand the connection between . . . eating unhealthful food
and subsequent health outcomes at the time they initially consume”).
115

McKinnon, supra note 93, at 311 (arguing that lack of accurate information in the
market place relating to diet prevents individuals from accurately assessing the healthy
content of food and beverages).
116

John Cawley, An Economic Framework for Understanding Physical Activity and Eating
Behaviors, 27 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 117, 121 (2004).
117

Margo G. Wootan & Melissa Osborn, Availability of Nutrition Information from Chain
Restaurants in the United States, 30 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 266, 268 (2006) (referring to
a study finding that people “consistently and substantially underestimated the calorie content
of popular restaurant meals, underestimating by 200 to 600 calories per meal”).
118

Id.

119

Russell L. Rothman et al., Patient Understanding of Food Labels: The Role of Literacy
and Numeracy, 31 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 1, 5 (2006) (finding that only 20% of individuals
can accurately calculate the contribution of a single food item to recommended daily
intake); Strand, supra note 95, at 1254 (suggesting that in the context of eating behavior,
individuals may suffer from bounded rationality because “it may be too costly or difficult to
unravel the relationship between various eating patterns and disease”).
120

Strand, supra note 95, at 1254.
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VI. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF OBESITY TAX
The externality of costs borne by society arising out of obesity prompted some to
call for a tax assessment on unhealthy eating and sedentary lifestyle to reflect the
true costs associated to the related behavior.121 Proponents of such a policy assert
that the externalized costs can only be addressed by internalizing the costs of obesity
and that a tax assessment is one means of internalizing the cost. 122 Specifically,
proponents of a tax strategy on unhealthy foods and beverages contend that a tax
assessment would result in higher prices, which would likely cause some individuals
to decrease consumption of unhealthy foods and beverages. 123 It may also lead to a
decline in medical costs incidental to obesity treatment.124
Proponents of tax assessments to influence the obesity problem point to the
impact that tax legislations had on the consumption level of alcohol, as well as on
the prevalence rate of cigarette smoking in the U.S. 125 A review of the literature on
cigarette taxes reveals that taxation is an effective pricing strategy to influence health
behavior.126 Research indicates that taxes on cigarettes lower both sales and
consumption of the product.127 For example, one study examined the effect of state
cigarette tax increases on cigarette sales. 128 By reviewing cigarette sales data from
1955 to 1988 in all 50 states, the researchers found that there was a significant

121

Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health, 46 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED.
S199, S204 (2003) (“[i]ndividuals acting in their own self-interest . . . will not effectively
address the problem [of obesity] because they do not internalize some of the major costs or
benefits of action or nonaction.”); see Strand, supra note 95, at 1240.
122

See ELSTON ET AL., supra note 82, at 178 (explaining the impact of tax assessment on
the demand for unhealthy food); see also Strand, supra note 95, at 1232 (arguing that adding a
tax on unhealthy eating behavior is one way to make the activity‟s true costs reflective in the
price).
123
See ELSTON ET AL., supra note 82, at 172 (“As a demand-side tool, a tax placed on a
particular product leads to an increase in the end price of that product. According to the law of
demand, price increases lead to a reduction in quantity consumed.”); Michael F. Jacobson &
Kelly D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft Drinks and Snack Foods to Promote Health, 90 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 854, 854 (2000) (estimating that a 5% tax on soft drinks would result in a 2%
decline in sales).
124

Jacobson & Brownell, supra note 123, at 854.

125

See e.g., Phillip J. Cook & Michael J. Moore, The Economics of Alcohol Abuse and
Alcohol Control Policies, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS, 120, 130 (2002) (reviewing prior literature, the
authors concluded that excise taxes on alcohol beverages are effective in reducing alcohol
consumption); David T. Levy, Frank Chaloupka, & Joseph Gitchell, The Effects of Tobacco
Control Policies on Smoking Rates: A Tobacco Control Scorecard, 10 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT.
& PRAC. 338, 339 (2004) (indicating that prior studies have found that a tax increase on
cigarettes generally results in a price increase and a reduction in consumption, with a price
elasticity of demand in the range of 0.3 and 0.5).
126

Levy, Chaloupka, & Gitchell, supra note 125, at 338.

127

Id. at 340.

128

Dan E. Peterson et al., The Effect of State Cigarette Tax Increases on Cigarette Sales,
1955 to 1988, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 94, 94 (1992).
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inverse relationship between tax increases and cigarette sales. 129 Accounting for
changing attitudes on smoking and enactment of clean indoor air policies, the study
determined that for each increase in cigarette taxes, sales fell by 0.75 packs per
capita.130 Similarly, researchers controlling for government health warnings on
cigarette labels and changing public opinion on smoking found that a $0.01 increase
in state tax per pack of cigarettes is associated with a .631 pack per capita reduction
in consumption; whereas, a 0.01 increase in federal tax per pack of cigarettes was
associated with a 1.12 packs per capita reduction in consumption. 131 Studies have
found that higher cigarette taxes reduce smoking among both youth and adults. 132
Furthermore, studies show that directing revenues generated from such excise taxes
toward the implementation of tobacco control and cessation programs results in an
additional decline in tobacco use.133
The experience with cigarette tax, however, may not be parallel to the context of
unhealthy foods. First, since there is no minimum daily requirement of tobacco
consumption, there is no problem with assessing a cigarette tax high enough to drive
consumption level to zero.134 In contrast, the goal is not to eliminate all caloric
intake, but only excess calories.135 Second, deterring consumption of specific
unhealthy food items may not be as successful as a tax on cigarettes because tobacco
lacks a substitute; but certain categories of unhealthy food items or beverages may
easily be replaced by other unhealthy food and beverage items. 136 For example, a tax
assessment on food items with high fat content may prompt individuals to reduce
consumption of those food items, but may cause an increase consumption of food
items that are high in carbohydrates. Consumers would reduce consumption of
certain unhealthy taxed food items, only to substitute to alternative food items that
129

See generally id.

130

See Peterson et al., supra note 128, at 95.

131

See Kenneth J. Meier & Michael J. Licari, The Effect of Cigarette Taxes on Cigarette
Consumption, 1995 through 1994, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1126, 1127 (1997).
132

See Levy, Chaloupka, & Gitchell, supra note 125, at 339-40 (summarizing the results of
several studies finding that youth and young adults are more sensitive to price changes in
cigarettes than adults); see also David T. Levy et al., The Effects of Tobacco Control Policies
on Smoking Rates: A Tobacco Control Scorecard, 10 J PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRAC. 338
(2004).
133

See Matthew C. Farrelly et al., The Impact of Tobacco Control Programs on Adult
Smoking, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 304, 304 (2008) (describing how cigarette excise tax along
with smoking-cessation education campaigns have been effective in a number of states at
curbing cigarette consumption among adolescence).
134

ELSTON ET AL., supra note 82, at 176.

135

See id. (“Unlike food, there is no minimum daily requirement of tobacco so problems
associated with driving consumption to zero, posed no concern in controlling tobacco use. For
food, the objective is not to eliminate all caloric intake, but only the calories that are in excess
of daily requirements.”).
136

See Oliver Mytton et al., Could Targeted Food Taxes Improve Health?, 61 J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY CMTY. HEALTH 689, 690 (2007) (finding that taxing only the principal sources
of dietary saturated fat is unlikely to reduce the incidence of cardiovascular disease because
the reduction in saturated fat is offset by a rise in salt consumption).
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may be similarly unhealthy, and ultimately failing to improve the overall eating
patterns in a way that reduces obesity. 137
Proponents of the tax approach assert that regardless of whether such tax policies
would in fact alter behavior in the context of obesity, such a policy could generate
significant fiscal revenues.138 Those revenues could be used to offset public medical
costs associated with obesity, to address the obesity problem through information
campaigns, to subsidize the purchase of healthy foods, or to subsidize the costs of an
active lifestyle.139
VII. PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND THE OBESITY TAX
Nonetheless, public discourse on the topic suggests that there is a divergence of
opinions on the desirability of a tax assessment unhealthy foods and sedentary
activities.140 National polls suggest that Americans are generally reluctant to support
such tax assessments as a policy response to the obesity problem. 141 Opposition to
tax assessment on unhealthy foods and beverages is multifaceted. Some oppose such
assessment based on a fairness argument, asserting that it disproportionately and
adversely affects low-income families.142 Others contend that such legislation would

137

Id.

138

See Jacobson & Brownell, supra note 123, at 854 (arguing that legislators prefer to
establish tax rates for entire classes of foods, like snack foods, rather than taxing an attribute
like saturated fat levels in food).
139
See ELSTON ET AL., supra note 82, at 181 (“[A]nother alternative would be to place
subsidies on the energy-output side to encourage physical activity.”); id. at 178 (“[T]he tax
revenues can be used to further reduce the burden of the externality in terms of providing
better education on the implications of being obese, providing low-cost exercise facilities for
the public, and otherwise providing reimbursement to individual who are making healthy
choices and lower the public costs of health care.”); Jacobson & Brownell, supra note 123, at
854 (“Even small taxes on widely consumed foods can raise substantial revenues.”); id.
(estimating that tax on soft drinks, candy, chips, and other snack items raises about $1 billion
per year nationwide).
140

See Sewell Chan, A Tax on Many Soft Drinks Sets Off a Spirited Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2008, at A36 (describing public disagreement relating to a proposed tax assessment
on sugary sodas and juice drinks in New York); David Lazarus, Tax Junk Food: Fight Obesity
One Penny at a Time, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011, at C-1 (reporting on a controversial
proposed tax levy in California on beverages with caloric sweeteners).
141
NPR, NATIONAL SURVEY OF HEALTHCARE CONSUMERS: ATTITUDES ON TAX FOR SUGARY
DRINKS, SNACKS, AND FAST FOOD (2010), available at http://factsforhealthcare.com/pressroo
m/NPR_report_TaxingSnackFoods.pdf (finding that only 22% of respondents support
increasing taxes on carbonated soft drinks and 27% of the respondents support increasing
taxes on snack foods such as chocolates, sweets, chips, and cookies); J. Eric Oliver & Taeku
Lee, Public Opinion and the Politics of Obesity in America, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL‟Y & L.
923, 925 (2005) (referring to their survey from 2001 finding that “most Americans were still
not concerned with obesity, were less likely to support most obesity-related policies such as
taxing snack foods”).
142
See Sayward Byrd, Civil Rights and the ―Twinkie‖ Tax: The 900-Pound Gorilla in the
War on Obesity, 65 LA. L. REV. 303, 332-33 (2004) (contending that when an excise tax is
levied on an item of food, the price increase places a disproportionate tax burden on lowincome individuals); Edward P. Richards, Legal Frameworks for Preventing Chronic Disease,
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be unfair because it penalizes non-obese and obese people alike.143 Moreover, some
assert that taxes on unhealthy foods are challenging to administer because it is
difficult to identify which foods should be taxed and which should not. 144 Finally,
some view a tax assessment on unhealthy foods as an unwarranted restriction on
people‟s freedom to make their own dietary choices. 145
Recent public concern about the obesity problem, however, appears to have
evolved. Through the late 1990s and early 2000s, few viewed obesity as a major
public health problem.146 Beginning in 2002, public opinion polls shifted noticeably
with almost one quarter of the public identifying obesity as one of the top three
health problems facing America.147 This shift in perception likely convinced more
individuals to support the use of narrowly-targeted tax assessments to address the
issue.148 For example, the public now appears to be more tolerant of a tax on

33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 94, 96 (2005) (explaining how “[t]axes to raise the cost of high-calorie
foods will further reduce the ability of the poor to purchase food, and food insecurity is a
contributing cause to obesity”).
143

See Epstein, supra note 10, at S154 (“The person who counts calories and exercises
faithfully is penalized because she chooses to eat a cream pie as part of a sound overall diet.”).
144
See Anja Hilbert et al., Primary Prevention of Childhood Obesity: An Interdisciplinary
Analysis, 1 OBESITY FACTS 16, 21 (2008) (“Presumably, the most frequently discussed option
is to tax food items with regard to their fat content. However, fats may, first, not be equally
harmful and thus, should not be treated equally . . . It can easily be shown that definitional
problems are inherent to such tax constructions and also arise when considering other taxation
bases, for example, energy density, specific food types, or maximum percentages of certain
ingredients.”); Jacobson & Brownell, supra note 123, at 856 (suggesting that California
repealed its tax on snack foods largely because the opponents contended that the tax was
difficult to administer).
145
Note, The Elephant in the Room: Evolution, Behaviorialism, and Counteradvertising in
the Coming War Against Obesity, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1173 (2003) (quoting GERALD
DWORKIN, PATERNALISM 19, 22 (Rolf Sartorious ed., 1983)) (arguing that tax assessment on
unhealthy food items constitute government paternalism, or “interference with people‟s liberty
for their own good”).
146

See Rogan Kersh & James A. Morone, Obesity, Courts, and the New Politics of Public
Health, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL‟Y & L. 839, 849-56 (2005) (summarizing the view held by
some that the government has no role intervening in an area as personal as one‟s diet); Oliver
& Lee, supra note 141, at 936 (referring to polls in 2001 indicating low perceived concern
among the public about obesity relative to other public-health problems); Mark Schlesinger,
Editor‟s Note: Weighting for Godot, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL‟Y & L. 785, 785-86 (2005)
(referring to the public‟s perception in the 90s that obesity is not an important public-health
concern).
147

See Robert J. Blendon et al., The Continuing Legacy of September 11 for Americans’
Health Priorities, HEALTH AFFAIRS 269, 273 (2003) (based on the Harvard School of Public
Health/Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and International Communications Research polls);
see also Lake Snell Perry & Associates, Obesity as a Public Health Issue: A Look at
Solutions, PROGRAM FOR HEALTH SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENT, 2 (2003), http://www.phsi.harvar
d.edu/health_reform/poll_results.pdf (finding that 79% of Americans consider adult obesity to
be a major public-health problem).
148
See Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: Public Opinion on Health Care Issues, KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION, 4 (2009), http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7945.pdf (finding that
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unhealthy foods, at least when it is limited in scope, used to fund activities targeting
childhood obesity,149 and dedicated to curbing the rise of unhealthy eating in
society.150 Furthermore, the public appears to be supportive of the use of taxes to
offer incentives for individuals to engage in healthy behavior. 151
VIII. TAX AS A TOOL IN ADDRESSING THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC
A. Introduction
Historically, U.S. tax assessments on unhealthy food and beverages began at the
federal level during World War I as an attempt to raise funds for the war efforts and
to deter consumption of luxurious goods.152 Congress considered soft drinks and
candy to be extravagance that needed to be curtailed through tax imposition. 153 At
the state level, taxation of unhealthy food and beverages began during the Great
Depression.154 In an attempt to counter a severe drop in revenues from property tax,
which at that time was the main source of revenue for state governments, more than
55% of respondents favor increase in taxes on unhealthy snack foods and 53% favor increase
in taxes on soda and sugary soft drinks).
149

See W. Douglas Evans et al., Public Perceptions of Childhood Obesity, 28 AM. J. PREV.
MED. 26, 29 (2005) (“Respondents strongly supported small ($25) tax increases to support
childhood overweight and obesity interventions (71% favor).”); Lake Snell Perry &
Associates, supra note 147, at 6 (finding that 76% of Americans support tax increase to fund
government programs that address childhood obesity).
150
See Wendy Sheu, The Evolution of the Modern Snack Tax Bill: From World War I to
the War Against Obesity, 21 (2006), http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/789/Sheu06.pdf
(citing a survey funded by the California Endowment finding that 62% of Californians support
a special tax on soft drinks and food advertising to fund anti-obesity efforts); Jacobson &
Brownell, supra note 123, at 856 (45% of adults in the U.S. that were surveyed in 1999 as part
of a nationally representative opinion poll indicated that $0.01 taxes per pound of soft drinks,
chips, and butter, with the revenues directed towards public health campaign that promotes
healthy eating was acceptable).
151
See Oliver & Lee, supra note 141, at 936 (finding that a majority of the public is willing
to spend additional tax dollars ($50 per year) on public space for exercise).
152
See Sheu, supra note 150, at 5 (citing War Revenue Act, 40 Stat. 300, §§ 313-15
(beverages), War Revenue Act of 1917: Hearing on H.R. 4280 Before the Senate Committee
on Finance, 65th Congress, 1st Sess. (1917) (Report No. 75) (“[A]pproves the scheme . . . by
which so-called soft drinks . . . are taxed.”)).
153

See Sheu, supra note 150, at 5 (citing STAFF OF COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 65TH
CONG., REPORT ON H.R. 8245, REP. NO. 350 (1921)) (suggesting that the goals of the War
Revenue Acts are to “encourage thrift and economy and to prevent extravagance well as to
provide revenue”). However, several years later, Congress repealed the soft-drink and candy
taxes in the 1994 Revenue Act as part of a campaign to reduce federal taxes. See Carl Shoup
et al., Historical Document: Facing the Tax Problem: Book One: Background 30, TAX
ANALYST (Feb. 15, 1996), http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/ED0E10B36C5
3638485256F1F005C4EB7?OpenDocument.
154
See ROBERT MURRAY HAIG & CARL SHOUP, THE SALES TAX IN THE AMERICAN STATES 7
(1934) (observing that between 1929 and 1933, eighteen states enacted sales tax to address the
impact of the Great Depression); Kirk J. Stark, The Uneasy Case of Extending the Sales Tax
on Services, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 435, 440 (2003) (attributing the emergency nature of the
Great Depression as the triggering event for states to widely adopt sales tax).
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twenty states adopted general sales tax on all non-exempt food items.155 Since soft
drinks and candy were viewed as luxuries at that time, they were not classified as
exempt food items.156 By the 1960s, a general sales tax levy, which excluded soft
drinks and candy from the exemption of food items, was widely adopted by a
majority of the states.157 In addition to the enactment of generally applicable sales tax
on soft drinks and candy, starting during the 1950s, a number of states have also
begun imposing a special excise tax on soft drinks and candy. 158
Starting in the 1990s, however, the country witnessed a movement toward the
repeal of many tax assessments on unhealthy foods and beverages. 159 With strong
support from the food and soft-drink industry lobby, a number of states repealed
their snack tax by the late 1990s.160 Despite the industry push back, it appears that a
growing number of legislative bodies considered tax bills on unhealthy food and
beverages during the past decade.161 This trend appears to coincide with some

155

See id.

156

See HAIG & SHOUP, supra note 154, at 118 (describing efforts by state legislators to
enact sales tax on luxury goods, including soft drinks and ice creams).
157

See Jacobson & Brownell, supra note 123, at 855 (providing a list of states, in Table
1.1, that adopted their first statewide sales tax by excluding soft drinks and candy from
exemption of food items).
158

See Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, Staff Legislative Bill Analysis: S.B. 1520, Soda Tax,
3 (2002), http://www.boe.ca.gov/legdiv/sptleg/pdf/sb1520-1cwfinal.pdf (listing West Virginia
as the first state to impose an excise tax on soda in 1951).
159
See Jacobson & Brownell, supra note 123, at 855 (“Twelve cities, counties, or states
have reduced or repealed their snack taxes in recent years.”).
160

See id. at 856, Table 2; see also MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS 99-101 (2002)
(describing the growth of the food-lobbying industry); Peter T. Kilborn, Soft Drink Industry Is
Fighting Back Over New Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at A12; Health Policy Tracking
Service, Trends in State Public Health Legislation Status of 2006 Legislative Activity 2006
Year-End Report, THOMPSON WEST, 35 (2007), http://www.healthystates.csg.org/NR/
rdonlyres/AECD80BD-EFA1-4A75-B47F-097DE6B3BF4D/0/FINAL2006YearEndReport.p
df (“Opponents, including the Grocery Manufacturers of America and the Snack Food
Association, have helped defeat [legislations taxing sodas and snacks]. They argued that
taxing sodas and snack foods leads to consumer and retailer confusion, establishes
government imposed preferences and creates competitive disadvantages for retailers whose
businesses operate near state borders.”).
161

See Sheu, supra note 150, at 17 (citing H.B. 3283, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2005);
L.B. 628, 99th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2005); L.D. 505, 121st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2005); S.B.
114, 2004 Leg. Sess. (W. Va. 2004); H.B. 1215, 79th Leg. Ass., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2004); H.B.
2116, 49th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Okla. 2004); S.B. 374, 46th Leg., 2nd Sess. (N.M. 2004); H.B.
1164, 113th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Ind. 2004); S.B. 897, 92nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2003); H.B.
481, 2003 Leg. Sess. (Ga. 2003); A.B. 9145, 226th Leg. Sess.. (N.Y. 2003); S.B. 5928, 58th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003), S.B. 1520, 2002 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2002)); see also Jacobson &
Brownell, supra note 123, at 855 (providing a list of 19 states and cities that have adopted tax
polices on nutrition-deficient food items over the past ten years).
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scholars call for the need of a policy to tax unhealthy foods and beverages as part of
a comprehensive strategy to address the obesity crisis. 162
B. Current Use of Tax Legislations to Reduce Consumption of Unhealthy Food
Given the increased public concern, federal and state governments consider
utilizing the tax system as a way of countering the growing obesity problem. 163
Federal and state governments explored the use of the tax system to address the
obesity problem using a two prong approach: (1) tax assessments to penalize
individuals‟ unhealthy eating behavior; and (2) tax incentives to reward individuals‟
healthy eating behavior.164 The goal of such price manipulations is to encourage
individuals to engage in healthier food-consumption behavior.165
States have been particularly vigorous in adopting tax legislations that assess a
tax on unhealthy food and beverages. 166 For example, thirty-four states currently
assess taxes on soda sold at grocery stores and thirty-nine states assess taxes on such
beverages sold through vending machines. 167 Similarly, thirty states impose sales tax
on candy; twenty-nine states apply taxes on chewing gum; and nineteen states assess
taxes on ice cream.168 In states where a sales tax is used, the tax appears to be higher
for soda and lower for candy or snack items, and the sales tax appears to be higher
for soda and snack food items sold from a vending machine compared to similar
goods purchased from a grocery store.169 Finally, more than half of the states adopted

162

See generally Kelly D. Brownell, The Chronicling of Obesity: Growing Awareness of
Its Social, Economic, and Political Contexts, 30 J. HEALTH POL. & L. 955, 957 (2005);
Schlesinger, supra note 146, at 785-86.
163

See Jacobson and Brownell, supra note 123, at 854 (describing efforts by state and local
governments to tax sugar-sweetened beverages as a way of generating revenues and reducing
the consumption of such items).
164

See notes 158-195 and accompanying text.

165

See Leonard H. Epstein et al., The Influence of Taxes and Subsidies on Energy
Purchased in an Experimental Purchasing Study, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 406, 406 (2010)
(“Research in the natural environment and laboratory has revealed increases in purchases of
healthier foods when the prices of such foods are reduced and reductions in purchases of less
healthy foods as their prices are increases. In addition, we have shown in laboratory studies
that purchases of healthy foods may increase when prices of less healthy foods are
increased.”); Anne Marie Thow et al., The Effect of Fiscal Policy on Diet, Obesity, and
Chronic Disease: A Systematic Review, 88 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 609, 609 (2010)
(“Taxing less health foods could create a financial incentive for consumers to avoid them.
Studies on the effect of manipulating food prices show that both individual consumers and
population groups do respond as predicted.”).
166
See generally Jamie F. Chriqui et al., State Sales Tax Rates for Soft Drinks and Snacks
Sold Through Grocery Stores and Vending Machines, 2007, 29 J. PUB. HEALTH POL. 226
(2008).
167

Id. at 239-40 (finding that 34 states assess sales taxes on soft drinks at grocery stores).

168

Id. at 239 (listing states with sales-tax legislations on soft drinks, chewing gum, ice
cream, candy, chips, and pretzels).
169
Id. at 239-40 (finding that the median tax rate on soft drinks purchased at a retail store
in states that have a sales tax is 4.5%, while it is only 3.0% for candy and 2.75% for chewing
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a more punitive tax regime toward soft drinks and/or snack food items by imposing a
higher tax rate on the purchase of such items compared with the general food tax rate
in that state.170
Assessing sales taxes on unhealthy food and beverages is also a commonly used
practice in various other countries. Some European Union countries impose valueadded taxes on soft drinks, snack foods, and sweets; whereas other countries impose
general sales tax on similar items.171
While pervasive in nature, these U.S. tax laws were not adopted with the primary
objective of altering healthy behavior. 172 Instead, these provisions were adopted as a
broad based sales tax with the goal of raising revenues for general use. 173 Indeed,
despite numerous attempts by a number of states to assess an excise tax on unhealthy
food and beverages,174 no state currently has such a targeted tax assessment at the
consumer level.175 However, at least seven states have adopted narrowly-targeted tax
gum, while the median tax rates for similar products sold at a vending machine is 5.0%, 4.5%,
and 4.5%, respectively).
170
Id. at 238 (“Interestingly, 28 states tax soft drinks and/or snack products at a higher rate
than the food tax rate in the state, indicative of the „disfavored‟ status attributed to these
products.”).
171
See Martin Caraher & Gill Cowburn, Taxing Food: Implications for Public Health
Nutrition, 8 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 1242, 1244 (2005) (describing the food-tax legislations
in European countries and Australia); Phil Cain, Hungary for a ―Fat Tax‖, GLOBAL POST,
June 21, 2011, available at http://www.globalpost.com/print/5652451 (describing the recently
enacted tax on junk food in Hungary).
172

See Chriqui et al., supra note 166, at 242; Caraher & Cowburn, supra note 171, at 1245
(suggesting that tax legislations on food items has been primarily motivated to raise funds, not
to alter behavior).
173

Id.

174
See Chriqui et al., supra note 166, at 242 (describing efforts by the grocery lobby to
forestall the adoption of an excise tax on unhealthy food and beverages); Daniel Kim & Ichiro
Kawachi, Food Taxation & Pricing Strategies to ―Thin Out‖ the Obesity Epidemic, 30 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. 430, 431 (2006) (referring to the failed attempt by Maryland legislature
in 2004 to reinstate snack food tax); Assemb. 669, 2011-12 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), available
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0651-0700/ab_669_bill_20110407_amen
ded_asm_v98.html (the assembly bill would have imposed a tax on sodas and other sugary
beverages to fund obesity prevention programs); S. 567, 2010 Leg. (Kan. 2010), available at
http://www.kansasvotes.org/Legislation.aspx?ID=115452 (stating that the Senate bill would
have imposed a tax on the manufacture and sale at retail of sweetened beverages); H. 1170,
114 Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) (proposing to impose an 11.5% tax, in addition
to other applicable taxes, on the retail sale of minimally nutritious foods or beverages); H.
39A, 2007 424th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Md. 2007) (proposing to provide that a
certain exemption under the sales and use tax for certain sales of food would not apply to
certain snack food); S. 228, 47th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2006) (proposing to assess soft
drink tax on any wholesaler who sells soft drinks); Assemb. 237, 98 Leg. Sess., 2007-08 Reg.
Sess., (Wis. 2007) (proposing to asses a tax on the sale of soft drinks in the amount of $0.21
for each gallon of bottled soft drinks sold); Bao Ong, New York’s Soda Tax Plan Dies After
Industry Ad Campaign, N.Y TIMES, July 26, 2010, available at http://dinersjournal.blog
s.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/new-yorks-soda-tax-plan-dies-after-industry-ad-campaign/.
175
See Chriqui et al., supra note 166, at 242 (“There are no current examples of a specific
„junk food‟ or „fat tax‟ being applied to snack products and soft drinks or other unhealthy food
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assessments on unhealthy food items and beverages that are imposed on sellers of
such items, such as manufacturers, distributors, and wholesalers. 176
Some legislators raised concerns about assessing an excise tax on unhealthy
foods and beverages due to its regressive impact, which disproportionately affects
those with lower incomes.177 Hence, some states considered offering low income
taxpayers with food tax credit to offset the costs of food consumed at home. 178
Despite recent calls by some to assess a federal tax on junk foods and soda, 179 the
federal government does not currently tax the sale of unhealthy food and
beverages.180 Instead, the federal tax code offers incentives to certain taxpayers to
participate in weight loss activities by allowing them to deduct the costs of various
expenses, under Internal Revenue Code § 213(d), related to a weight loss program,
such as bariatric surgery, FDA approved weight loss drugs, physician and hospitalbased programs, behavioral counseling, the services of dietitians and exercise
specialists.181 Nonetheless, the incentives offered by the federal tax provisions are
limited to the treatment of individuals suffering from an existing disease, including
obesity, rather than offered for individuals to take preventative measures to avoid the
disease.182
products in the United States. . . .”); Kim & Kawachi, supra note 174, at 431 (“[N]o U.S.
states currently levy taxes on snack foods.”).
176

See Chiriqui et al., supra note 166, at 229-30 (summarizing the tax assessments on
manufacturers, wholesalers, and distributors in 7 states on soft drinks, soda syrups, and ice
cream).
177

See Caraher & Cowburn, supra note 171, at 1246.

178

See S. 1822, 24th State Leg. (Haw. 2007) (proposing to establishes a $100 food tax
credit to residents earning less than $30,000 per year); H. 588, 59th Leg., 2nd reg. Sess. (Idaho
2008) (enacting income tax credit to offset the sales-tax taxpayers pay on food consumed at
home).
179

See Kelly D. Brownell et al., The Public Health and Economic Benefits of Taxing
Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1599 (2009) (recommending the
implementation of a federal-sin tax on sugary beverages).
180
See WHITEHOUSE TASKFORCE ON CHILDHOOD OBESITY REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT,
SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF CHILDHOOD OBESITY WITHIN A GENERATION, 56 (May 2010),
available at http://www.letsmove.gov/white-house-task-force-childhood-obesity-report-presid
ent (“The potential influence of food prices on consumption necessitates consideration of the
extent to which changes in farm, tax, and subsidy policies might affect consumption
patterns.”).
181
See Rev. Rul. 2002-19, 2002-1 C.B. 778 (ruling that “uncompensated amounts paid by
individuals for participation in a weight-loss program as treatment for a specific disease or
diseases (including obesity) diagnosed by a physician are expenses for medical care that are
deductible under §213, subject to the limitations of that section.”); see generally Karen Fitzner
et al., Recent Tax Changes May Assist Treatment of Obesity, 16 MANAGED CARED INTERFACE
47 (2003) (summarizing the impact of the new IRS interpretation of the deductibility of
certain medical expenses related to the treatment of obesity).
182

See Fitzner et al., supra note 181, at 48 (“This ruling concluded that when a physician
diagnoses a taxpayer as being obese, the fees to join a prescribed weight-loss program and
attend periodic weight-loss meetings qualify as deductible medical care under Internal
Revenue Code §213(d).”).
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C. Current Use of Tax Legislations to Increase Physical Activity
To address the obesity epidemic, the federal government and a number of state
governments explored ways to utilize the tax system to encourage active lifestyles.
At the federal level, the expense of an employer-provided wellness program for
employees is deductible by the employer as a business expense under Internal
Revenue Code § 162.183 Most recently, bills have been introduced both in the House
of Representatives and the Senate to encourage Americans to engage in more
physical activity.184 Under one proposed bill, revisions to the tax code would make
physical activity more affordable by allowing taxpayers to use pretax dollars
contributed to their existing health investment accounts to pay for participation in
fitness activities and exercise equipment. 185 Similarly, under another proposed bill,
employer-paid gym memberships would be excluded from the employee‟s taxable
income, while the employer would get a tax deduction for the same amount. 186
Next, to further incentivize employers to take an active role in encouraging and
facilitating opportunities for its employees to remain active, the House of
Representatives considered a bill that would amend the tax code to provide
employers with a 50% tax credit for the costs of providing employees with a
qualified prevention and wellness program. 187 Another bill proposed during the same
session would amend the Internal Revenue Code to encourage use of transit and
bicycle commuting by equalizing and increasing to $230 the tax exclusion for both
transportation and parking fringe benefits. 188 Yet under another proposal, the House
of Representatives would allow a medical-care deduction for certain exercise
equipment and physical fitness programs. 189 Finally, the Senate considered a bill that
would amend the tax code to allow a tax deduction of up to $500 in fees for the
participation of a taxpayer‟s dependent child in any organization that promotes or
provides physical activity.190
183

See IRC §162.

184

PHIT Act of 2011, H.R. 2649, 112th Cong. (2011).

185

See Personal Health Investment Today Act of 2011, H.R. 2649, 112th Cong. (2011)
(proposing an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code to allow for expenditures for physical
fitness programs and exercise equipment to be payable out of pre-tax health investment
accounts such as flexible spending accounts, medical savings accounts and/or medical
reimbursement arrangements).
186
See The Workforce Health Improvement Program Act of 2009, H.R. 2106, 111th Cong.
(2009) (allowing employers to reimburse employees for fees, dues, or membership expenses
paid to an athletic or fitness facility (limit of $900/year/employee) without taxing the
employee). Employees provided with use of an on premises employer owned fitness facility
would not have been taxed on the value of such. Id. Also, it would have allowed employers a
tax deduction for fees, dues, or membership expenses paid to an athletic or fitness facility
(limit of $900/year/employee). Id.
187

See Promoting Health and Preventing Chronic Disease through Prevention and Wellness
Programs for Employees, Communities, and Individuals Act of 2009, H.R. 3468, 111th Cong.
(2009).
188

See Green Routes to Work Act of 2009, H.R. 3271, 111th Cong. (2009).

189

See Healthy Savings Act of 2009, H.R. 3508, 111th Cong. (2009).

190

See S. 2842, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Similar efforts to increase physical activity during the tax law were undertaken at
the state and local level. Indiana allows employers with 2 to 100 employees to
receive a tax credit for 50% of the costs incurred in a given year for providing
qualified wellness programs to their employees, including employees‟ enrollment in
physical activity programs, and hosting physical activity programs. 191 In 2004, New
Jersey enacted a tax provision that provides a $0.10 deduction per bicycling mile
commuted to and from work.192
Other states explored different approaches, using state tax codes to offer
incentives to taxpayers to become more active, but none of these efforts have yet
been enacted into law. For example, Pennsylvania and New York both proposed a
tax credit of up to $1,000 for health-related purchases, such as exercise equipment
and gym membership.193 Likewise, in 2011, to promote fitness among its residents,
Connecticut introduced a bill that exempted from sales tax any services offered by
personal trainers and health clubs. 194 In 2009, the Illinois General Assembly
considered a bill providing for a $500 tax credit to cover costs of enrolling children
in qualified physical activity program.195
Instead of offering individuals tax incentives to engage in more physical activity,
some states focused on offering tax incentives to employers to make the work
environment more conducive for employees to engage in physical activity during the
work day.196 For example, in 2010, Connecticut legislators considered a bill allowing
corporations a tax deduction of up to one million dollars for costs related to
providing wellness and preventive care programs to employees. 197 Similarly, District
of Columbia legislators considered an amendment to the tax code that enables
employers to obtain a tax credit for costs related to their employees‟ wellness
activities, including gym membership. 198 Likewise, Maine legislators considered
providing small businesses with a tax credit to offset the costs of institutionalizing a
191

See Ind. Pub. Law 218 (2007), available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2007/
PDF/HE/HE1678.1.pdf; see also Qualified Wellness Program, IND. DEP‟T OF PUB. HEALTH,
http://www.in.gov/isdh/25041.htm.
192
See N.J. Assemb. B. 3442 (2004) (“A taxpayer shall be allowed a deduction against
gross income for the miles traveled by the taxpayer during the taxable year commuting by
means of bicycling between the taxpayer‟s place of residence and place of employment or
terminal near those places. The amount of which deduction shall be equal to $0.10 per mile
traveled.”).
193

See N.Y. State Assemb. B. 1495 (2011), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn
=A01495&term=2011; Pa. Gen. Assemb. H.B. 939 (2009).
194
See Conn. Gen. Assemb. Sess. B. 156 (2011), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/
TOB/S/2011SB-00156-R00-SB.htm.
195

See Ill. H. B. 893 (2009) (proposing an income tax credit for employers who pay costs
in connection with a qualified wellness program in the amount of 50% of those costs per year
up to $200 per employee for the first 200 employees and $100 per employee for the remaining
employees).
196

See Conn. Gen. Assemb. Prop. B. 78 (2010).

197

Id.

198

See D.C. Good Corporate Citizenship Business Friendly Incentive Act of 2010,
available at http://dccouncil.us/images/00001/20100617160622.pdf.

2012]

TAX POLICY AND THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC

259

wellness program in the workplace, including furnishing equipping, maintaining an
exercise facility, and providing incentive awards to employees who exercise
regularly.199 Other states recently considered similar bills, including New Mexico,
Texas, and Wisconsin.200
Internationally, Canada is at the forefront of tax incentives aimed at increasing
physical activity. In 2007, the Canadian federal government enacted the Children‟s
Fitness Tax Credit, which provides an annual non-refundable tax credit for up to $75
per child to parents for the costs of their child‟s organized physical-activity
program.201 Approximately 6% of Canadian taxpayers claimed the credit in 2008. 202
Recently, the government announced plans to extend similar benefits to Canadian
adults.203
IX. A REVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF TAX LEGISLATIONS ON
HEALTHY EATING AND PHYSICAL ACTIVITY
There is currently limited research on the potential impact of tax subsidies or tax
assessments on physical-activity level.204 While inconclusive, one recent study found
199
See An Act To Establish a Wellness Tax Credit, HP1443, 123d Leg. (Me. 2009),
available at http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/bills_123rd/billpdfs/HP144301.pdf.
The bill provides that:

. . . a tax credit to employers of 20 or fewer employees for the expense of developing,
instituting, and maintaining wellness programs for their employees in the amount of
$100 per employee, up to a maximum of $2,000. A wellness program includes
programs for behavior modification, such as smoking cessation programs, equipping,
and maintaining an exercise facility and providing incentive awards to employees who
exercise regularly.
Id.
200

See S.B. 148, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008) (providing an income-tax credit for
employers for a portion of the costs of providing wellness programs for employees, including
the encouragement of physical activity); S.B. 556, 81st Leg. (Tex. 2007) (charging the state
Obesity Council with considering the feasibility of a tax incentive to employers who promote
activities designed to reduce obesity in the workforce); Assemb. B. 91 (Wis. 2009) and S.B.
56, 2011-12 Leg. (Wis. 2009) (proposing an income-tax credit for a workplace wellness
program defined as health or fitness program in the amount equal to 30% of the cost of the
program).
201

See Barbara von Tigrstrom et al., Using the Tax System to Promote Physical Activity:
Critical Analysis of Canadian Initiatives, 101 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH e10, e11 (2011) (“The
maximum claim [of the Children‟s Fitness Credit] is $500, resulting in a tax credit of up to
$75 per child (i.e., 15%) at current rates.”).
202

See id.

203

See Stephen Harper Announces an Adult Fitness Tax Credit, MARKET WIRE (2011),
available at http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/stephen-harper-announces-an-adult-fitn
ess-tax-credit-1421840.htm.
204

See Odette Madore, The Impact of Economic Instruments That Promote Healthy Eating,
Encourage Physical Activity, and Combat Obesity: Literature Review, LIBRARY OF
PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARY INFORMATION, AND RESEARCH SERVICE (Jan. 8, 2007), http://w
ww.parl.gc.ca/content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0634-e.htm (“[A] literature search
produced no analytical papers assessing the potential impact of economic instruments
promoting physical activity.”).
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that a tax on sedentary activity may lead to an increase in moderate-intensity
physical activity, a decrease in time spent sitting and an overall increase in physical
activity.205
More research exists on the impact of tax subsidies and tax levies on eating
patterns, weight, and various health indicators. Some studies estimated that the
demand for snack foods would only reduce by a small amount with a small increase
in tax rates.206 Similarly, studies found a weak link between relatively modest taxes
on unhealthy beverages and adolescent and adult weight level. 207 But numerous
studies demonstrate that large changes in the prices of foods and beverages lead to
changes in how much people consume those items. 208 For example, several studies
205

See Patrick Bergman et al., Congestion Road Tax and Physical Activity, 38 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. 171, 176 (2010) (reporting that while their findings are inconclusive,
researchers suggest that a congestion road tax might increase physical activity among
individuals with motorized vehicles).
206

See Fred Kuchler, Abebayehu Tegene & J. Michael Harris, Taxing Snack Foods:
Manipulating Diet Quality or Financing Information Programs, 27 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 4, 17
(2005) (predicting that a 20% tax on salty snack foods would reduce consumption by only 5.5
pounds per person per year, or 830 calories); Fred Kuchler, Abebayehu Tegene & J. Michael
Harris, Taxing Snack Foods: What to Expect for Diet and Tax Revenues, 747 CURRENT ISSUES
IN ECON. OF FOOD MARKETS 1, 10 (2004) (finding that relatively low tax rates of $0.01 per
pound would not appreciably alter consumption and would have little effect on diet quality or
health outcome).
207

See Daniel Kim & Ichiro Dawachi, Food Taxation and Pricing Strategies to ―Thin
Out‖ the Obesity Epidemic, 30 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 430, 434 (2006) (arguing that the
price elasticity of snack foods in the average household would result in minimal impact on
consumption); Lisa M. Powell et al., Associations Between State-Level Soda Taxes and
Adolescent Body Mass Index, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S57, S61(2009) (“Based on
differences in state-level soda tax rates over the past decade, the results did not reveal any
statistically significant associations between the tax measures and adolescent weight . . .”).
208

See Tatiana Andreyeva et al., The Impact of Food Prices on Consumption: A Systematic
Review of Research on Price Elasticity of Demand for Food, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 216,
220 (2009) (estimating that a 10% tax on soft drinks would result in a maximum of 10%
reduction in demand for those items); Roy Bahl, Richard Bird & Mary B. Walker, The
Uneasy Case Against Discriminatory Excise Taxation: Soft Drink Taxes in Ireland, 31 PUB.
FIN. REV. 510, 523 (2003) (finding that a 20% reduction in a soft-drink tax resulted in a 6.8%
increase in average soft-drink consumption); Kiyah J. Duffey et al., Food Price and Diet and
Health Outcomes, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 420, 424-25 (2010) (estimating that an 18%
tax on soda and pizza would be associated with a “reduction of roughly 5 lb. (2.25kg) per
person per year and significant reductions in the risks of most obesity-related chronic
diseases”); Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Impact of Targeted Beverage Taxes on Higher-and
Lower-Income Households, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2028, 2033 (2010) (“these results
show that large taxes on SSBs [sugar-sweetened beverages] are likely to be effective at
positively influencing weight outcomes . . . .”); Simone A. French et al., Pricing and
Promotion Effects on Low-Fat Vending Snack Purchases: The Chips Study, 91 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 112, 114 (2001) (finding that a price reduction of 10%, 25%, and 50% on low-fat
snacks and healthy food items in a vending machine were associated with significant increase
in low-fat snack sales); Simone A. French et al., Pricing Strategy to Promote Fruit and
Vegetable Purchase in High School Cafeterias, 97 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS‟N. 1008, 1009 (1997)
(prices of fruits and vegetables were reduced by 50% at a high school cafeteria leading to a
fruit sales increase by four fold and vegetable sales increase by two fold); Thow et al., supra
note 165, 612 (“This review indicates that food taxes and subsidies can influence consumption
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estimated that a 10% increase in the price of sugar-sweetened beverages could
reduce its consumption by 8 to 11%.209 It appears that a tax increase on unhealthy
foods, rather than a tax subsidy for healthy foods, is likely to be more effective in
increasing healthy eating patterns. 210
Furthermore, research suggests that higher prices of unhealthy foods and
beverages are associated with reductions in body mass index (BMI) and the
prevalence of overweight and obesity. 211 For example, several studies found that an
increase in the price of fast food resulted in a significant decline in the prevalence of
overweight or obesity.212 Conversely, research linked a price subsidy in the price of
unhealthy food items to an increased consumption of such food items and an
in high-income countries and that imposing substantial taxes on fattening foods may improve
health outcomes such as body weight and chronic disease risk.”); Steven T. Yen et al.,
Demand for Non-Alcoholic Beverages: The Case of Low-Income Households, 20
AGRIBUSINESS 309, 315 (2004) (“In sum, demand for all beverages is responsive to changes in
own prices and total beverage expenditures.”).
209

See Andreyeva et al., supra note 208, at 220 (estimating that a 10% tax on soft drinks
would result in up to 10% reduction in demand for those items).
210

See Epstein et al., supra note 165, at 412 (“The results provide stronger support for
taxes than for subsidies as a means of reducing consumption of less healthy foods and
increasing consumption of healthier alternatives”).
211

See M. Christopher Auld & Lisa M. Powell, Economics of Food Energy Density and
Adolescent Body Weight, 76 ECONOMICA 719, 738 (2009) (finding that among adolescence, “a
decrease in the relative price of energy-dense foods tends to increase BMI if the price of a
calorie of energy-dense food is lower than the price of a calorie of less energy-dense foods”);
Kim & Kawachi, supra note 174, at 432 (suggesting that a state-level relationship exists
between implementation of soft-drink and snack taxes and changes in obesity prevalence);
Dragan Miljkovic et al., Economic Factors Affecting the Increase in Obesity in the United
States: Differential Response to Price, 33 FOOD POL‟Y 48, 58 (2008) (finding that increasing
the current price of sugar-based foods by 1% decreases the probability of a normal person
from becoming overweight or obese by 2.32% and 3.07%, respectively); Lisa M. Powell &
Frank J. Chaloupka, Food Prices and Obesity: Evidence and Policy Implications for Taxes
and Subsidies, 87 THE MILBANK QUARTERLY 229, 249 (2009) (“[W]e estimated that small
taxes or subsidies were not likely to produce significant changes in BMI or obesity
prevalence, but that nontrival pricing interventions might have a measurable effect on
Americans‟ weight outcomes, particularly those of children and adolescents, low-SES
populations, and those most at risk for overweight.”); Ronald Sturm & Ashlesha Datar, Food
Prices and Weight Gain During Elementary School: 5-year Update, 122 PUB. HEALTH 1140,
1141 (2008) (finding that children that live in areas with higher real fruit and vegetable prices
experience greater increases in BMI); Ronald Sturm & Ashlesha Datar, Body Mass Index in
Elementary School Children, Metropolitan Area Food Prices, and Food Outlet Density, 119
PUB. HEALTH 1059, 1065 (2005) (“We found that relative food prices are associated with
changes in the BMI and obesity rates, and the relationship is significant and robust for fruit
and vegetable prices: higher fruit and vegetable prices predict greater BMI increase.”).
212

See Auld & Powell, supra note 211, at 730 (finding that the price of fast food is
negatively associated with BMI); Chou et al., supra note 29, at 584 (finding “that downward
trends in food prices account for part of the upward trend in weight outcomes”); Lisa M.
Powell et al., Access to Fast Food and Food Prices: Relationship with Fruit and Vegetable
Consumption and Overweight Among Adolescents, 17 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH
SERVS. RES. 23, 39 (2006) (finding that “a dollar increase in the price of a fast food meal
reduces the prevalence of overweight by 2.2% points”).
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increase in obesity.213 Aside from influencing the level of consumption and weight,
some studies also linked imposition of food tax on cardiovascular disease and
mortality rate.214
X. CONCLUSION
Research suggests that modest tax assessments on unhealthy food and beverages
do not result in significant changes to consumption patterns. 215 But similar to the
dramatic decline in tobacco use following a relatively large tax increase, 216 a large
excise tax on unhealthy food and beverages may have a significant impact on
consumption patterns and on the prevalence of overweight, particularly among
groups that are at a high risk for obesity, including those with low income, as well as
children and adolescents.217 Furthermore, dedicating the funds of such excise tax on
unhealthy food and beverages towards comprehensive obesity prevention programs
may lead to further reduction in obesity levels among adults and children.218
Researchers extensively explored the relationship between a tax on unhealthy
foods and/or beverages, consumption patterns, and overweight. 219 Likewise,
researchers have also examined the use of tax subsidies to promote healthier eating
patterns.220 Little research has been conducted, however, on the potential impact of
either a tax targeting sedentary behavior or a tax subsidy targeting active lifestyle. In
particular, policy makers would benefit from quasi-experimental research studies
that examine the direct impact of a tax assessment or a tax subsidy on an individual‟s
physical activity level.
Indeed, perhaps the most impactful tax strategy to increase healthy eating
practices and non-sedentary lifestyle may be the product of a multilevel approach. In
such approach, a tax is assessed on unhealthy food or on sedentary activities, while a
subsidy is offered for the purchase of healthy foods or for being physically active. 221

213
See Abay Asfaw, Do Government Food Price Policies Affect the Prevalence of
Obesity? Empirical Evidence from Egypt, 35 WORLD DEV. 687, 698 (2007) (“The results of
this study show that there is an inverse and statistically significant relationship between the
mothers‟ BMI or obesity and the price of baladi bread and fully and partially subsidized
sugar.”).
214

See Tom Marshall, Exploring a Fiscal Food Policy: The Case of Diet and Ischaemic
Heart Disease, 320 BRITISH MED. J. 301, 303 (2000) (estimating that by extending value to the
added tax in the U.K. to the main sources of dietary saturated fat, between 900 and 1,000
premature deaths per year may be prevented).
215

See supra text accompanying notes 206 and 207.

216

See supra text accompanying notes 127, 129-130.

217

See supra text accompanying notes 208, 211-212.

218

See ELSTON ET AL., supra note 82, at 178 (“The tax revenues can be used to further
reduce the burden of the externality in terms of providing better education on the implications
of being obese.”).
219

See supra text accompanying notes 208-213.

220

See supra text accompanying notes 206-210.

221

See Caraher & Cowburn, supra note 171, at 1249 (“We conclude that the focus on a
„food tax‟ may be misplaced and instead recommend looking at pricing policies that have the
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A team of researchers recently examined such a strategy and estimated that taxing
less healthy foods and subsidizing fruits and vegetables by 17.5% could prevent
almost 3,000 cardiovascular disease and cancer deaths per year in the United
Kingdom.222 Combining taxes on unhealthy food and beverages along with subsidies
could prove to be a powerful strategy to address the obesity problem, and it may also
help to alleviate potential regressive nature of the excise tax by enabling consumers
to switch to more healthy products without incurring additional costs.

dual impact of discouraging key behaviors and encouraging others—in other words, a mix of
„taxes‟ and subsidies.”).
222

See Kelechi E. Nnoaham et al., Modeling Income Group Differences in the Health and
Economic Impacts of Targeted Food Taxes and Subsidies, 38 INT‟L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1324,
1324 (2009) (“Taxing „less healthy‟ foods and subsidizing fruits and vegetables by 17.5%
could avert up to 2,900 cardiovascular disease and cancer deaths yearly.”).

